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 [The text examines methodological consequences of anti-metaphysical turn 
of British empiricism in the field of anthropology. I argue that this shift 
reinforces anthropology in its descriptive and interdisciplinary form, because 
destruction of metaphysically grounded subjectivity carried out in the course 
of evolution of empiricism provides epistemological legitimization of the idea 
of anthropological research as morally neutral and religiously indifferent 
procedure. In the final part of the article the difficulties caused by application 
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Introduction 
Evolution of empiricism in this work will be understood as simply 
a train of thought leading from Locke, through Berkeley, to Hume. I assume 
that without causing any controversy it can be briefly described as a process 
of reduction of the extent of our knowledge or the content of its objects. In 
other words, Locke distinguishes three — so to speak — types of the objects 
of human knowledge, namely impressions and ideas, the self, which both of 
these belong to (and which is intuitively certain of its own, and of God’s 
existence), and external material objects represented by ideas. Berkeley 
eliminates one of these types by reducing the world as we know it to 
impressions and ideas, and the self, which they belong to. The self also 
remains related to God, since its ideas are means of communication with 
Him. Hume, however, silences this communication, finally reducing the 
extent of our knowledge to impressions and ideas only. This makes them 
represent nothing and belong to nothing, for the self now turns out to be 
merely the bundle of impressions and ideas. Thus, the common sense vision 
of the world still evident in Locke’s thought falls apart into sequence of 
fictitiously ordered impressions.  
The importance of this train of thought and its final conclusions is hard 
to overestimate in the context of development of philosophical anthropology. 
On the one hand, they undoubtedly accelerated this development, especially 
contributing to those forms of anthropological interest, whose 
methodological ideal was a description from external points of view (as 
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opposed to introspective descriptions epistemologically founded in 
subjectivity). On the other hand, they are certainly burdened with problems, 
which eventually provoked more — so to speak — existential forms of 
anthropology, i.e. normative rather than descriptive only. In what follows, 
I focus on these two aspects. First, I attempt to bring out and emphasize 
those features of empirical anti-metaphysical turn, which reinforced 
anthropological discourse in its interdisciplinary and descriptive form. Then, 
I will reflect on the sources of strength of their influence on the 
anthropological projects carried out in the second half of the XVIII century. 
Finally, I examine how they functioned inside these projects and how they 
were determining the evolution of the very idea of anthropology. 
 
 
Methodological outcomes of anti-metaphysical turn 
As the enlightenment’s trust in rationality eventually turned against 
itself, and the subjectivity was narrowed to a series of random perceptions, 
the need for a new methodology of anthropological inquiries became 
evident. The operations of mind, uprooted from their traditional foundation 
in the rational subject or the self (which was always equipped with some sort 
of absolute grounding in order to legitimize epistemological value of its 
ideas), can no longer function neither as a distinctive form of human activity, 
nor as the most adequate descriptive category of specifically human 
existence. In this new horizon rational subjectivity appears to be merely 
a resultant of many different external factors, which are usually impossible 
for the subject to identify, since mechanisms of their influence remain latent 
content of consciousness. Hence, the examination of these external factors 
seems to be more and more important. What can be seen here is one of the 
key premises of the belief which in its radical form will emerge in XIX century: 
 
The hope of rendering the wholeness of possible experience 
comprehensible by means of one categorial system fades away. It is 
replaced by the conception that “adequate ideas” contain hallmarks of 
truth sine relatione ad obiectum (without any link to object), and that it 
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is the experience that reaffirms the operations of intellect from outside 
[Saint-Sernin 2001, 197]1. 
 
If the concept of a knowing subject produced by the evolution of 
empiricism can be metaphorically depicted as a screening of moving images 
(symbolizing impressions and ideas) in the absence of a spectator 
(symbolizing a rational subject, the alleged nest of individual identity, which 
after all happened to be epistemological fiction), then the general 
methodological demand stemming from this train of thought is to find an 
equivalent or a compensation of this absence. Since the “internal observer” 
(i.e. Ego, a clear and distinct internal source of authority, which decides 
whether representations are true and actions justified) lost its credibility after 
becoming a mere illusion, it must be replaced by an “external observer” or — 
considering the whole constellation of man’s live determinants — “external 
observers” rather. So adapting these external points of view is gradually 
earning the status of the one and only instrument of examining the human 
stream of perceptions. And it is believed (or hoped at least) that this 
instrument will allow philosophers and scholars to discover and to describe 
complex contingency of human existence. This means, in other words, the 
postulate of complete reification of human being, of inscribing man’s 
existence into realm of objects. It is the fundamental requirement that must 
be fulfilled if anthropological enquiries are to be fruitful in any philosophically 
or scientifically desirable way. Radical undermining of clearness, distinctness 
and full accessibility of self’s thoughts, left thinkers and scholars alone with 
the procedure applied hitherto only to the realm of world identified as 
external to Ego. Due to that, its reification seemed to be the only possible 
way of examining man’s specific condition. After all, the main premise for 
dissolving the rational subject or the self in a multitude of perceptions was 
                                               
1 This hope, however, did not disappear instantly, nor commonly. Kant, for example, 
remained its most famous advocate. Nevertheless, according to Saint-Sernin’s interpretation, 
this hope finally dies in XIX century, which — as Schnädelbach puts it — orders to see Kantian 
project at this time as “happily overcome error of thought” [Schnädelbach 2001, 40]. All 
citations form Polish editions translated by D.M.  
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actually the limitation of what’s real only to these perceptions. At the same 
time, the collection of the latter (or the world revealed by it) was made by 
means of this very limitation the only field worth of interest. Thus, closing the 
abyss between the world of objects and the specifically human experience 
that one has of their very existence, became a necessary starting point of 
anthropological investigations2. 
This auto-interpretation of man from empirical stand leads therefore 
to a peculiar methodological volt. It entails radicalization of the epoch’s 
dominant trends by refuting the concept of using an auto-reflectively based 
subject as the source of objectivity. Instead it’s forcing thinkers to choose 
many different points of view in order to collect information necessary for 
producing multi aspect descriptions of human being. This new 
methodological requirement of adapting to the roles of “external observers” 
manifests itself in attempts to explain the mystery of man as a variously 
determined creature (initially mostly biologically, historically, and later also 
socially and culturally). 
What is also worth noting here is that the old abandoned perspective 
is different from the new one also in terms of the ways it is legitimized. 
Whereas the former is — metaphorically speaking — sanctioned vertically, 
the latter is authorized horizontally. What I want to say is that actually the 
model of explanation dismantled in the enlightenment era (and this process 
is illustrated precisely by the evolution of empiricism) always amounts to 
                                               
2 Couple of centuries later, Claude Lévi-Strauss, in lapidary way will bring out the logic of this 
transformations (showing thus how vital and influential they were), when characterizing his 
own method he’ll claim that “the ultimate goal of humanities is not to construe man, but to 
divide him in order to solve his mystery” [Lévi-Strauss 1969, 370]. Now, relation between 
general methodological orientation of structuralism and consequences of destruction of 
subjectivity carried out by empiricism implied here may not seem obvious. Nevertheless, 
what makes it more credible is that this methodological creed is presented as a conclusion of 
criticism of “alleged obviousness of Ego” as a possible way of knowing man. For actually — 
Lévi-Strauss says — this self-obvious Ego is a trap, which renders knowing of man impossible 
[Ibidem, 373]. 
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establishing some hierarchy, which finally refers to some kind of absolute 
being. And this absolute being sanctions the whole construction (innate idea 
of perfect being in Cartesian subject, God as a warrant of compatibility of 
monads’ representations in Leibniz Monadology, absolute spirit whose 
activity supports the existence of the world in Berkeley’s philosophy — they 
all serve this purpose). Yet, the explanatory method of capturing examined 
subject as stuck in a spider’s web of various determinants does not imply 
such a hierarchy. On the contrary, it gives all those types of determinants 
(and characteristics derived from them as well) the same status. So at least 
initially, none of them can be privileged whatsoever. All of the possible 
complexes of contingencies are potentially equally attractive. They are 
equally demanding of scholars’ inquiring interest. From methodological point 
of view therefore grasping human being as historically determined is of the 
same importance as approaching the nature of man as a result of — say — 
social, biological or cultural determinacy. And the source of their legitimacy 
or — in other words — the reason why they are perceived as equally 
important is that they are all considered to be constituents of human nature.       
This basic methodological orientation is crucial for development of 
anthropology practiced as descriptive analysis. Moreover, it gives 
anthropology a truly interdisciplinary character. It is because meeting its 
requirements means widening and partition of philosophy of man, which 
must now include many different disciplines. Hence, the latter would now 
shape anthropological discourse3. The first stages of this process can be seen 
already in Hume’s writings, whose contemporaries considered him as 
a political and economical thinker, and as a historian rather than as 
a philosopher. And they did so for a reason. However, what is important here 
is not the multitude of Hume’s interests, but the way he devoted himself to 
them. Regardless of what fragment of reality would be the current subject of 
                                               
3 Initially, inscribing human being in sequence of natural determinants dynamically increased 
the significance of physiology, anatomy and psychology. In XIX century range of disciplines 
crucial for the face of anthropology includes sociology, political economy, ethnology, and 
international law [Schrag 1980, 32].   
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his scrutiny, they all did not fascinate him as such, but mostly as sources of 
knowledge of human nature4. In other words, they function as relatively 
independent fields of research, which deliver information about various 
aspects of human life. Indeed, they become a sort of catalogue of 
descriptions of these aspects. It is particularly evident in his Natural History of 
Religion, where Hume introduces — so to speak — anthropology of religion 
as a descriptive characteristic of empirically accessible manifestations of 
religion. Moreover, the crucial feature of this description is that when it 
refers to internal sensation or so called religious experience it does so not to 
find the final sanction of religious beliefs, but only to bring out their latent 
psychological motivation. By doing so, it inscribes them in the realm of 
external objects (similar methodological instruments can be traced in Hume’s 
writings on ethics). 
What begs consideration, however, is the power of influence of this 
methodological orientation as it is exemplified in Hume’s writings, and its 
ability to inspire. In other words, is it justified to see philosophical tradition, 
which culminates in Scotsman’s work as a sort of catalyst that causes and 
accelerates the process of eradication of metaphysical premises and their 
moral consequences from anthropological theories? After all, as for example 
Lepenies argues, the exclusion of these kinds of contents from intellectual 
practice is one of the key elements of the vision of the world, which was 
implicit in the very first stages of development of early modern natural 
science [Lepenies 1996, 14]. An important constituent of this original model 
can be extracted already from Descartes’ concept of provisional morality. Be 
it manifestation of methodological conformity, but this procedure neutralizes 
otherwise paralyzing threat for any action, posed by radical skepticism. What 
is more important, however, is that it allows to carry out any given 
                                               
4 Later also Kant takes into account this kind of anthropological research, when 
characterizing what anthropology should be, he mentions natural history, biographies, arts 
and novels as auxiliary tools of the discipline [Kant 2005, 4]. Interestingly enough, 
somewhere else but in similar context Kant is more precise and refers to Shakespeare’s 
tragedies, Moliér’s comedies, Henry Fielding’s novels, and… Hume’s “History of England” 
[Wood 2003, 48].    
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theoretical project as if it were isolated from any social or moral rules and 
without questioning their validity in everyday life [Ibidem, 16]. And as 
a consequence of popularization of this procedure of inquiry sui generis 
emancipation is attained:  
 
[I]ndependence from morality — relinquishment of political and moral 
orientation — indeed became condition of scientific investigations in 
modern natural science [Ibidem, 15]. 
 
The source of this independence emerges from a particular way of 
auto-identification and evaluation of early modern natural science, which is 
a kind of a synthesis of cognitive claims and relinquishment of orientation in 
questions of morality and worldviews [Ibidem]. Well, the unique legacy of 
empiricism lies exactly in the reinforcement of epistemological legitimization 
of this synthesis. In contrast to Descartes, for whom linking cognitive 
ambitions with resignation from advocating some moral rules is after all 
authorized by sort of practical wisdom or pragmatic need to work out some 
efficient principle of action, for Hume and his predecessors this conjunction is 
based on an original concept of reason and its tasks and competence. Having 
noticed the abyss between is/is not and ought to/ought not to and thus 
denying the possibility of inferring norms from facts [Kutschera 2007, 56], he 
renders the latter the basic objects of knowledge [Hume 2004, 25]. In this 
way Hume legitimizes and reinforces conviction about moral neutrality as a 
rudimentary feature of a scientific method. And so he becomes and advocate 
for instrumentalization of reason — a tendency which was gaining more and 
more importance at that time. For the intrinsic correlate of conclusions so 
radically presented by Hume in his writings is his skeptical distrust in 
cognitive powers of reason: instead of the ability to reach objective truth and 
moral good and to be guided by them, he consistently sees an instinctive skill 
of gathering and processing information [Hume 1896, 98], whose true 
purpose is only to protect biological existence. According to this view 
rationality is admittedly capable of creating hierarchy of goals and of 
determining means of their realization. It cannot, however, absolutely, 
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axiologically sanction these operations. As far as values are considered, the 
only legitimization left is the one that refers to subjective preferences. 
Undoubtedly, this is one of many parts of the transformation described by 
Max Horkheimer as a process of subjectivization and formalization of ratio: 
 
On the basis of subjectivization concept thinking can not be of any help 
in determining whether given goal is desirable in itself. Acceptance of 
ideals, criterions of our conduct and our beliefs, leading principles of 
ethics and politics, all our final decisions are dependent on factors other 
than reason [Horkheimer 2007, 40].  
 
Reason, as the Greek speculation taught us, is the ability of reaching an 
absolutely objective realm of thought that in itself is an autonomous reality. 
These attributes of rationality render it primary to and independent from 
human practice of thinking, but at the same time they do not preclude any 
relation between them. And according to this intellectual tradition, there is a 
relation indeed, because human mind is capable of contemplating and 
cognizing this absolute objectivity. In this way it can keep discovering (not 
creating) true structure of reality, and as a result it can properly place man in 
the wholeness of being, which in turn allows for identifying man’s true rights 
and obligations [Ibidem]. For reality is a cosmos — an order, which 
regularities are compatible with the rules of human thinking. Although 
modified to some extent, this fundamental conviction was shared both by 
philosophical and religious intellectual paradigms. It shaped their relations as 
well: religion and philosophy could disagree as to what are the true sources 
and credible methods of knowing reality (and moral conclusions they 
implied), they were unanimous however as far as the aforementioned 
compatibility is considered, which rendered the knowledge they seek 
possible at all [Ibidem, 47]. Nevertheless, this presupposition was challenged 
by a new philosophical orientation, and this orientation — Horkheimer 
concludes — was empiricism5.  
                                               
5 Not only empiricism, but also Calvinism Horkheimer holds responsible for this challenging 
[Ibidem, 48]. 
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Methodological consequences of these transformations already have 
been indicated. The belief that there is only one truth about enquired subject 
and only one way leading to it was given up, and obviously enough this was 
an inspiration for searching and discovering alternative ways and new truths. 
And were they discovered, they could not entail moral conclusions anymore. 
One of the first consequences of this new situation was gradual legitimization 
of actual autonomy of disciplines hitherto variously instrumentalized in the 
field of philosophy. In this context, blending of medical and philosophical 
discourses is of great importance. Indeed, philosophy expropriated — so to 
speak — languages of physiology, anatomy and of what would become 
psychology. Of course, the first and the second were developed relatively 
independent from philosophy6. Nevertheless, they enjoyed “civil rights” in a 
kingdom of philosophy, where they served as useful descriptive tools. And 
they were used by almost all great thinkers of XVII and XVIII century, 
including Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz, and of course Locke, 
Berkeley and Hume. Surely, this coexistence was not free from ambiguities. 
Using metaphors borrowed from physiology or other aforementioned 
disciplines in philosophical context was a kind of ennoblement for these 
branches of knowledge, as they could be absolutely sanctioned this indirect 
way (be it as it may, at least some philosophical theories promised such a 
sanction). On the other hand, by using their discoveries, philosophy 
subordinated them and pacified — so to speak — those trends of new 
                                               
6 Flamish scholar Andreas Vesalius already in 1543 initiates early modern anatomy in his 
work De humani corporis fabrica. In 1628 Englishman William Harvey in his Exercitatio 
Anatomica de Motu Cordis et Sanguinis in Animalibus presents holistic description of blood 
circulation, and between 1757–1766 Swiss biologist publishes eight volumes of his Elementa 
Physiologiae Corporis Humani, where he enclosed all information known at that time about 
construction and functioning of human organism, thus laying foundations for modern 
physiology. 
Physiological vocabulary used in a field of philosophy had much earlier origin than newest 
physiological discoveries of that time. Descartes’ mechanistic interpretation of man’s 
physiology in his Traité de l’homme is actually based on anatomical and physiological 
discoveries of earlier scholars of definitely non-mechanistic orientation [Des Chene 2006, 67].  
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science, which could undermine its position or decrease its cultural 
significance by taking away fields of research reserved hitherto for philosophy 
only. So those trends remained ancillary to specific philosophical projects, 
which both instrumentalized and authorized them as well. However, the 
aforeoutlined questioning of the traditional concept of rationality, which 
served as a natural context for the use of physiological, anatomical and 
psychological vocabularies, renders them free from this subordination. They 
gain autonomy, but for the price of absolute certitude of their conclusions. 
This mechanism and its consequences for those disciplines and for 
philosophical anthropology as well, are best seen in a context of Leibniz 
thesis that laws of nature are manifestations of God’s rational actions; they 
are results of “choice made by the most perfect wisdom,” and as such they 
are neither absolutely necessary, nor completely arbitrary [Des Chene 2006, 
93] (for the former contradicts God’s freedom, and the latter contradicts 
God’s wisdom). The necessity of laws of nature is a moral one and it “arises 
from the free choice of wisdom in relation to final causes” [Ibidem]. As 
MacIntyre puts it, “morality did in the eighteenth century, as a matter of 
historical fact, presuppose something very like the teleological scheme of 
God (…)” [MacIntyre 2007, 56]. And not only morality, but also knowledge 
presuppose this scheme, one may be tempted to add, since also laws of 
nature, i.e. a proper subject of scientific knowledge, are teleologically linked 
with God. However, rationality and God were finally disconnected and reason 
instrumentalized in the course of evolution of empiricism (which is perfectly 
symbolized by subordination of reason to passions in Hume’s writings7), and 
thus the dictate of laws of nature was deprived of its moral sanction. And so 
were the products of new sciences, which tried to discover and examine 
those laws of nature. Moreover, those results were also deprived of absolute 
                                               
7 “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” [Hume 1896, 217]. Such 
a characteristic of reason serves Hume as an argument for claiming that morality stems from 
passions rather than reason. Indeed, having reduced reason to function of passions it is 
impossible to defend a theory that morality has its source in reason, for proving this means 
proving something opposite at the same time.  
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certitude. For, the empirical anti-metaphysical turn entails radical 
reformulation of the idea of knowledge and the concept of science. Already 
in Locke’s writings this idea turns away from certitude and gravitates towards 
probability. And the development of empiricism not only does not stop this 
tendency, but it solidifies this new status of knowledge. Hence, this status 
must be sufficient for all the disciplines or new sciences liberated from the 
theological corset, because this is exactly the way how the mechanism of 
gaining this freedom worked. 
 
For a whole group of thinkers it seemed possible to make headway 
beyond manifestly aporetic metaphysics by recourse to observation and 
experiment. To do so required a fundamental shift in the notion of what 
science signified, the surrender of the idea of absolute certainty and the 
acceptance of a contingent, fallible, continuously evolving series of 
nominal approximations with some less than perfect order of subjective 
probability. To be sure, one had to surrender certainty. One even had to 
surrender conceptual determination through grounding definitions. 
“Nominal essences” would have to make do since the “real essences” 
behind the actual world — as Locke argued and even Leibniz sometimes 
conceded — were not likely to become accessible to human 
understanding. If one made the transition to this “nominal” register, if 
one were content to settle for what “observation and experience” could 
document, what one found was not, to be sure, absolute truth, but it 
could be an intersubjectively confirmable generalization of “law,” albeit 
contingent and fallible [Zammito 2002, 225]. 
 
And such a transition was made by a significant part of the intellectual elite of 
the epoch. But loyalty to the assumptions of empiricism and hope for 
escaping the problems of metaphysics forced — as you can see — to pay 
a peculiar tribute. Breaking the chains of theology or metaphysics was 
synonymous to voluntary devaluation of cognitive claims and restraint from 
inferring and forcing moral conclusions. Consequently, although reflection 
deprived of grounding reference and carried out by reason which merely 
collects perceptions was to generate the knowledge of human nature, it is 
itself transformed into peculiar collection of more and more fragmentary 
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grasps — it evolves into knowledge of determined human beings in concrete 
situations [Wood 2003, 39]8. Universal principles of human conduct are now 
conceived as manifestations of instrumental functioning of reason. Analyzing 
and describing these manifestations as characterizing human behavior, man’s 
customs and habits, and his religious beliefs, all in a context of hidden 
biological, psychological, and historical determinants — this is what becomes 
the procedural norm of anthropology. And since any source of this research 
data must be purely empirical, and thus material, the whole human existence 
is gradually incorporated into the latter dimension. In other words, conditions 
for further dynamic development of anthropology as a discipline defining its 
subject in the context of mechanistically interpreted nature are created. It 
can be said therefore, that man’s auto-interpretation from empirical stand 
contributes to the development of philosophical anthropology because: 
1. It provides philosophical legitimization for the idea of science as 
a morally neutral procedure. 
2. It designates experiment and observation as methodological grounds 
for anthropological investigations.   
3. This way it completely incorporates human being and its conduct into 
empirically accessible material dimension. 
4. It postulates plurality of points of view as equal strategies of inquiry 
and description provided that they all remain empirical9.   
 
 
 
                                               
8 This impossibility of formulating general characteristic of human nature inspired Kantian 
project of anthropology. In his “pragmatic point of view,” anthropology should be 
characteristic of the human nature as a whole, and not the random assemblage of partial 
descriptions of human conduct in specific situations.    
9 Carsten Zelle suggests following collection of assumptions as fundamental for development 
of anthropology in XVIII century: 1) empirical orientation, i.e. emphasizing the importance of 
experiment and observation; 2) revaluation of sensuality; 3) pragmatic approach; 4) 
interdisciplinary interest in the “whole man;” 5) more popular, accessible style [ Zammito, 
25].   
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Methodology practiced 
The influence of this set of assumptions was continuously intensifying 
in the second half of XVIII century, which can be illustrated by the process of 
solidifying the idea of anthropology (the way its goal, subject and method 
were conceived). For example, Johann Gottlob Krüger, one of the prominent 
figures of the process, in his three volumes Naturlehre, published from 1740 
(the year Hume’s Treatise… was published) to 1749 (year after Hume’s 
Enquiry…) advocates for a “philosophy of the human body” as the causal 
explanation of health, and suggests it should be grounded not only in 
empirical knowledge, but also (and it is tempting to say still) on rational 
principles. Yet the same author in his Versuch einer Experimental-Seelenlehre 
(published sixteen years after the Treatise… and seven years after the 
Enquiry…) argues that philosophical knowledge of the soul needs rigorous 
experimental methodology based on observation, studies on clinical case 
histories and brain physiology [Zammito, 21]. His student, Johann August 
Unzer, tries to reconcile, in a sense, these two programs. There is a kind of 
correspondence, thus he claims, between every psychic and physical act of 
human organism [Ibidem]. And what is revealed in this attempt is a kind of 
tension, indeed, a very important one in the context of anthropology and its 
development. This tension has at least two aspects. The source of the first 
one is the body and soul dualism of the Cartesian origin (and it is worth 
noting that its influence is intensified here by the occasionalism and 
speculations of Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke and Berkeley), which begs 
consideration in the context of man’s complete incorporation in the realm of 
matter as it is implied by empirical methodology. Because of that, both 
Krüger and Unzer (and before them La Mettrie for example, reducing psychic 
phenomena to physiological mechanisms), attempt to neutralize this dualism 
or rather the problems it poses. The source of the other is the emphasis 
placed on the interdisciplinarity and religious indifference of anthropological 
enquiries. Philosophizing physicians of XVIII century, such as aforementioned 
Krüger, Unzer and La Mettrie, but also Albrecht von Haller and Georg-Ernst 
Stahl, formulated their theoretical framework with reference to anti-
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metaphysical turn of empiricism [Zammito 2002, 243]. And not for all of them 
was it an easy-going process. For some it was a serious problem to accept all 
the implications of that shift, especially theological ones. Nevertheless, those 
of methodological merit were usually welcome in spite of theological doubts, 
even for the price of aporetic attempts to explain the mysterious relation 
between body and soul [Ibidem]. Hence, the ideas of XVIII century 
anthropologists are stretched between Stahl’s animism and La Mettrie’s 
materialism, with all of them sharing the belief of rudimentary role of 
experience and observation. 
Manifestations of this tension can also be traced in anthropologists’ 
attempts to create experimental psychology by means of linking psychology 
and physiology, since these projects also aimed at explaining the linkage 
between body and soul. Unfortunately, their “natural” framework was the 
concept of instrumental rationality, which simply could not provide any set of 
criterions to regulate relations between different disciplines held important 
in the light of these anthropological investigations. And so, those relations 
were shaped in more or less arbitrary ways. Consequently, the need for some 
methodological modification became evident. And not any modification, but 
the one that would warrant new consolidating approach, meaning not only 
ordering of anthropological disciplines, but also inclusion of moral questions 
into the realm of inquiry. For that reason, other important figures in history 
of anthropology, like Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Struve, will emphasize their 
interest in the wholeness of human existence as the essential feature of the 
discipline. Struve’s belief will be adopted by Ernst Platner who will make it an 
axis of his complex anthropological project [Zammito, 22]. He will publish his 
Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise in 1772, defining the discipline’s 
character for years. Platner divided anthropological field of interest, 
distinguishing anatomical and physiological science, psychology (interested 
also in logical and esthetical issues), and finally anthropology conceived as an 
attempt to synthesize outcomes of the two former branches [Ibidem]. 
Supposedly this synthesis was too an attempt to account for the problematic 
relation between body and soul. This project, however, could not escape the 
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fundamental difficulties, since it was still completely inscribed in the 
aforeoutlined logic of transformation of the idea of scientific methodology 
and its cognitive pretensions. Platner’s very division of anthropology makes it 
explicit, that solving the mystery of body and soul is to be achieved by means 
of physiological discourse or physiologically interpreted psychology. It was in 
accordance whit his belief that mind is indeed a system of canals through 
which “liquid matter” or “vital spirit” flows. This physiological anchorage 
echoes of anti-metaphysical criticism. It is also an emanation of hope for 
replacing metaphysical radical dichotomy of body and soul with opposition 
between physical and moral, and for conceiving the latter as the evolutionary 
outcome of the former [Zammito 2002, 227]. But this, in fact, was rather 
obscuring the ontological abyss between mind and body, than finally 
explaining the relation between them. For, grounding in nature through 
physiology allowed perceiving physical and moral as two sides of the same 
coin, thus blurring the difference. And since also materialistic orientation was 
the inherent component of naturalistic methodology, the opposition of mind 
and body was soon enough replaced by a one-dimensional category of 
bodiliness [Ibidem, 228]. Therefore, although Platner’s program of 
synthesizing anthropology aimed at elaborating the holistic approach to 
human nature (which also meant re-inclusion of moral issues into the realm 
of anthropology), what it offered was, as a matter of fact, a kind of reduction. 
And so, philosophical anthropology would yet have to wait a while for an 
attempt to produce a genuinely holistic depiction of human existence. This, 
however, will require a completely new set of methodological assumptions.  
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